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Could it be right to convict and punish defendants using only 
statistical evidence? In this paper, I argue that it is not and explain 
why it would be wrong. This is difficult to do because there is a 
powerful argument for thinking that we should convict and punish 
defendants using statistical evidence. It looks as if the relevant 
cases are cases of decision under risk and it seems we know what 
we should do in such cases (i.e., maximize expected value). Given 
some standard assumptions about the values at stake, the case for 
convicting and punishing using statistical evidence seems solid. In 
trying to show where this argument goes wrong, I shall argue 
(against Lockeans, reliabilists, and others) that beliefs supported 
only by statistical evidence are epistemically defective and (against 
Enoch, Fisher, and Spectre) that these epistemic considerations 
should matter to the law.  To solve the puzzle about the role of 
statistical evidence in the law, we need to revise some commonly 
held assumptions about epistemic value and defend the relevance 
of epistemology to this practical question. 
 
1.  Introduction 
Let’s consider an example: 
Prisoners 
100 prisoners are exercising in the prison yard. Suddenly 99 of 
them attack the guard, putting into action a plan that the 100th 
prisoner knew nothing about. The 100th prisoner played no role 
in the assault and could have done nothing to stop it. There is no 
further information that we can use to settle the question of any 
particular prisoner's involvement (Redmayne (2008)). 
Knowing what we know and knowing that we'll never know more than this, would it be 
permissible to convict and punish a prisoner chosen at random from the yard? 
 This is a difficult question. While I think the following thesis is counterintuitive, there are 
powerful arguments for it:  
Punish: It is permissible to punish the defendant in Prisoners (and 
similar cases where the only evidence of guilt is statistical 
evidence).1  
There is a related epistemological thesis that I think we should consider alongside Punish:  
Believe: It is permissible to believe that the defendant is guilty in 
Prisoners (and similar cases where the only evidence of guilt is 
statistical evidence).2  
																																																						
1 The disagreement we'll focus on isn't about the justification of punishment, per se, but about the 
justification of punishment based on statistical evidence. For defenses of Punish, see Lempert 
(1977) and Steele (MS).  For arguments against the use of statistical evidence in civil and criminal 
law, see Apt (2016), Blome-Tillman (2015, MS), Buchak (2013), Colyvan, Regan, and Ferson 
(2001), Enoch, Fisher, and Spectre (2012), Lo (2008), Moss (forthcoming), Pritchard 
(forthcoming b), Redmayne (2008), Smith (2016, forthcoming), Staffel (forthcoming), Thomson 
(1986), and Tribe (1971). This paper focuses on criminal law.      
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While I also think this thesis is counterintuitive, a plausible line of argument supports this thesis, 
too. 
 In this paper, I shall argue that we should not convict and punish defendants in criminal 
trials on the basis of statistical evidence alone.  In the current debate, many of the philosophers 
critical of Punish appeal to intuitions that conflict with Believe.  Ultimately, I think that we can 
build a compelling case against both theses and that the best argument against Punish is built on 
an argument against Believe. In building this case against Believe, we face two significant 
obstacles. First, the most powerful argument for Punish, in my view, suggests that the 
permissibility of punishment has little to do with the epistemological considerations operative in 
debates about Punish. We need to show that epistemological debates about statistical evidence 
and the justification of full belief should matter to the law.    Second, even if we could show that 
these epistemological considerations are relevant to the debates about the permissibility of 
punishing on the basis of statistical evidence, we need to show where the argument for Believe 
goes wrong.  We need to show that the justification of full belief can require more than grounds 
that warrant a high degree of confidence.         
 The discussion is complicated because it touches upon controversial issues in law, moral 
theory, and epistemology. Let me provide a brief overview of the paper and my argument.  In §2, 
I shall present the argument for Punish. In §3, we shall review some of the more important 
objections to Punish.  In §4, I shall provide an argument for Believe that parallels the argument 
for Punish. As I see things, the case against Punish that we find in the literature suffers from two 
problems. The first problem is that the case is built on epistemological considerations that are 
supposed to show that Believe is mistaken. It is not clear what relevance these considerations 
have in a debate about Punish. The argument for Punish presented in §2 is valid and it's not clear 
which premise, if any, we should reject if we reject Believe. In short, we need to show that our 
two theses, Believe and Punish, are related and that an argument against the first can support an 
argument against the second. The second problem concerns the operative epistemological 
assumptions in the extant discussions of Punish. Because we have a valid argument for Believe 
that rests on some widely held assumptions about epistemic value, we have to do so work to 
show that Believe is mistaken.  In short, we need to show that there is something wrong with 
fully believing a defendant to be guilty on the basis of statistical evidence alone and address the 
argument for Believe.    
   In §5 and §6, I explain why I think we should reject Punish and Believe.  The rough idea 
is this.  Although the justification of action does not typically depend upon the justification of 
any particular set of beliefs (e.g., the justification of betting on Chelsea or taking an umbrella 
does not require, say, a justification of believing that Chelsea will win or that it will rain this 
afternoon), there are some acts that can only be justified if the agent can be guided by the right 
kinds of reasons. Actions that serve to express blame are an example. Punishment is an example.  
If it would be unreasonable to take some defendant to be involved in some criminal act, for 
example, this has a bearing on the justification of punishment in a way that, say, the justification 
of taking an umbrella doesn't turn on whether we would be justified in fully believing that it will 
rain or sleet.  As it happens, I think a case can be made for thinking that the justification of (full) 
beliefs concerning a defendant's guilt require more than grounds that would warrant a high 
degree of confidence in the defendant's guilt. In §7, I introduce a gnostic approach to epistemic 
value that should help us see why statistical evidence might fail to justify full belief (even when it 
justifies a high degree of confidence). In turn, it should help us see why considerations of 
																																																																																																																																																																								
2 Comesana (2009) offers a partial defense of the view that we can have justified (full) beliefs 
based on statistical evidence. Sosa (2015) does, too. See also Dorst (MS), Easwaran (2016), Foley 
(2009), and Sturgeon (2008). For arguments that such evidence cannot justify full belief, see 
Adler (2002), Kelp (forthcoming), Littlejohn (2012), Nelkin (2000), Ryan (1991), Smith (2016), 
and Williamson (2000). 
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expected epistemic value do not support Believe. In §8, I argue that we need this gnostic 
framework to solve the puzzles under consideration and discuss the significance of this for some 
sophisticated veritist views in epistemology inspired by Sosa's work on epistemic value. 
  
2. An Argument for Punish 
Our discussion concerns issues in the philosophy of law, so some stage setting is in order. I shall 
assume that punishment is sometimes justified and that the justification of punishment involves 
the justification of the imposition of the harms reasonably expected to come with punishment. If 
we think that it is prima facie wrong to act in ways that we should expect will result in these 
harms, we should hope that there is some good that can come from imposing the punishment. 
For the sake of this discussion, let us suppose that there is some such good but not worry too 
much about what that good might be. (If we do not assume this, it will be difficult to get the 
puzzle off of the ground because it might seem that all punishment is unjustified, in which case 
the side that things we shouldn't punish in our example win the debate before it starts.)  
We shall also assume that any just system of punishment involves some backward-
looking elements.  We don't have to assume that the potential goods that come from punishing 
people are characterized in backward-looking terms (e.g., retribution), only that we cannot 
impose the harms that come with punishment without any concern about whether the harms 
would be suffered by the guilty. While just punishment might serve a number of aims, it can only 
be just if, inter alia, it is a response to something that the defendant is answerable for.  
  When we think about things in these terms, we might say that the system that interests 
us recognizes that there is something good about punishing the guilty, something bad about 
punishing the innocent, that there is nothing good nor bad about failing to punish the innocent, 
and (most controversially, perhaps) something bad about failing to punish someone who is 
guilty.  If these are our values (or close enough to them for the purposes of this discussion), it 
will help shape our understanding of what kind of evidence we'd need to rightly punish.  
 Let's suppose that this matrix represents the kinds of values we want our criminal justice 
system to serve. We'll formulate a decision-matrix with two states, two prospective acts, and 
assign values to the act-state pairs as follows: 
 
Veritist Decision-Matrix  
 Guilty Innocent 
Punish +1 -10 
Don't Punish -1 0 
 
The matrix is described as a ‘veritist’ matrix because it is concerned with outcomes in which a 
defendant is correctly or incorrectly taken to be guilty.  Framed in this way, the states we should 
be concerned with are those that determine whether a belief in the defendant's guilt would be 
correct or incorrect.  This assignment of values to outcomes might not capture your take on the 
magnitudes of the relevant goods or evils, but readers are invited to tinker with the values to see 
if this would change the situation.       
 With these values and probabilities, it's clear that Punish maximizes the relevant expected 
value.3 Once we see this, we have our first argument for Punish:  
Primary Argument for Punish 
P1. Rationality requires us to maximize expected value. 
																																																						
3 To calculate the expected value of Punish, we sum the product of the probabilities and values 
of <Punish, Guilty> and <Punish, Innocent>. To calculate the expected value of Don't Punish, 
we sum the product of the probabilities and values of <Don't Punish, Guilty> and <Don't 
Punish, Innocent>. When we compare the two results, we see the expected value of Punish 
exceeds that of Don't Punish. 
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P2. Punish is the option that maximizes expected value.  
P3. So, rationality requires us to punish. 
P4. It would be right to do what rationality requires.4 
P5. So, it would be right to punish.5 
Many of us instinctively feel that there is something wrong with Punish.  The primary argument 
for Punish might make us worry about these intuitions.  The argument is valid.  We've used our 
values in formulating our decision-matrix. (Readers should remember that they are invited to 
tinker with the values in the matrix, but I ask them to remember that I can increase the number 
of prisoners to reinstate the argument.)  It is hard to see how we can reject (P2). This case looks 
like a straightforward case of decision under risk. It seems plausible that we ought to maximize 
expected value in such cases. Because of this, it's hard to see how we can reject (P1) or (P4). 
 
3. Against Punish 
Let's look at three objections to Punish. While these objections aren’t decisive as stated, they’ll 
help us see why we need the resources introduced later. 
 
3.1 Tribe and Reasonable Doubt 
Some object to the primary argument for Punish on the grounds that any conviction on the basis 
of statistical evidence violates the norm that juries should convict only when a defendant's guilt 
is beyond reasonable doubt. Tribe, for example, has proposed that the acceptance of Punish, 
'could dangerously undermine ... the values surrounding the notion that juries should convict 
only when guilt is beyond real doubt' (1971: 1372). He then offers these remarks:   
... to say that society recognizes the necessity of tolerating the 
erroneous "conviction of some innocent suspects in order to 
assure the confinement of a vastly larger number of guilty 
criminals" is not at all to say that society does, or should, embrace 
a policy that juries, conscious of the magnitude of their doubts in 
a particular case, ought to convict in the face of this 
acknowledged and quantified uncertainty. It is to the complex 
difference between these two propositions that the concept of 
"guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" inevitably speaks. The concept 
signifies not any mathematical measure of the precise degree of 
certitude we require of juries in criminal cases, but a subtle 
compromise between the knowledge, on the one hand, that we 
cannot realistically insist on acquittal whenever guilt is less than 
absolutely certain, and the realization, on the other hand, that the 
cost of spelling that out explicitly and with calculated precision in 
the trial itself would be too high (1971: 1375).  
																																																						
4 Gibbons (2013) and Lord (forthcoming) argue that what an agent ought to do is determined by 
the things that make it rational or reasonable for her to act. Zimmerman (2008) argues that what 
an agent ought to do is determined by what would maximize a kind of expected value.  
5 It might seem that the argument is more complicated than it needs to be.  I've stated it this way 
because there are interesting disagreements about both the relationship between rationality and 
obligation (e.g., between objectivists who think that there can be obligations to refrain from 
doing things that we're rationally required to do and authors who think that rationality and 
obligation are more intimately connected) and about the normative significance of expected 
value (e.g., between non-consequentialists who think that we should sometimes follow principles 
when we know that doing so stands in the way of promoting some good and those who think 
that we should use the tools of decision-theory to determine what to do).  [] defends a version of 
this argument and we can find seeds of it in Lempert (1977). 
 5 
I don’t think that these points should move the defenders of Punish.  
 Those who defend Punish have two things that they can say in response.  First, they 
might remind us that their argument rests on an assumption that Tribe does not challenge, which 
is that Punish maximizes expected value. He might think that even if Punish did maximize 
expected value, we will still see that we ought to follow the norm that he identifies. Why, we 
might ask, should we do that? If the matrix reflects the value and disvalue that we attach to 
things like punishing the guilty and punishing the innocent, why should we worry about a further 
ethical consideration having to do with reasonable doubt? We know in advance that conforming 
to some further norm would sometimes compel us to choose an option we know doesn’t serve 
our values as well punishing someone using statistical evidence would.  
 We know that the alternative that Tribe defends is a system that allows us to convict 
using forms of evidence that are less reliable than statistical evidence when it comes to 
identifying the guilty defendants as guilty and screening out the innocent defendants (e.g., the 
testimony of witnesses).6 Because the system that uses of statistical evidence is more reliable in 
sorting the guilty and innocent into the right category than one that uses a conflicting reasonable 
doubt standard, it might seem irrational, given our values, to stick to this reasonable doubt 
standard.  
 This first response isn’t terribly concessive. It simply points out that if there is a clash 
here of the kind that Tribe assumes, there is some reason to think that Tribe’s norm is spurious. 
We know conforming to it wouldn’t serve our values as well as using statistical evidence to 
secure a conviction in violation of the putative norm. There is a second more concessive 
response to consider. Tribe assumes that there is a clash here between a norm that says that we 
cannot convict if there is reasonable doubt and a norm that says that we should punish if doing 
so maximizes expected value.  Some proponents of Punish might say that this betrays a very 
strange understanding of reasonable doubt.  If we see punishing the innocent as a terrible thing 
and see failing to punish the guilty as a significantly less bad thing, the probability required for 
Punish to maximize expected value will be quite high. If it is high enough, shouldn’t the 
statistical evidence be sufficient to justify belief in the guilt of the defendant? If belief in the guilt 
of the defendant is justified, would that not satisfy any reasonable formulation of the reasonable 
doubt norm? When judges are asked to translate this talk of reasonable doubt into probabilistic 
terms, many judges have thought that the relevant probability could be less than .95.7 If you look 
at our decision-matrix and consider the probability at which Punish maximizes expected value, 
we cross that threshold with room to spare. 
 Tribe has to overcome two challenges to rebut the case for Punish. He needs to show 
that on the proper understanding of reasonable doubt, the statistical evidence doesn’t eliminate 
it. He then needs to explain why we should prefer a system that conforms to this norm to one 
that relaxes it and allows us to convict a defendant using statistical evidence when doing so 
maximizes expected value and thus appears to best serve the values we all share.   
   
																																																						
6 Remember that we are operating under the assumption that punishments are sometimes 
justifiably imposed, which means that juries sometimes have all the evidence they could need to 
vote to find a defendant guilty and for the criminal justice system to punish accordingly. The 
evidence that would justify such convictions is typically taken to involve things like testimony 
from reliable witnesses. In criticizing Punish, most would concede that this evidence is less 
reliable than the kind of statistical evidence we're discussing and still think that this evidence is 
adequate. Compare the situation to the lottery situation where writers like Harman (1968) think 
that we'd be justified in believing things reported in the paper but not justified in believing a 
ticket to be a losing ticket even though we recognize that the probability that the paper errs is 
greater than the probability that the ticket won. 
7 As noted by Thomson (1986) who cites the research of Simon (1969). 
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3.2 The Criminal Class 
Colyvan, Regan, and Ferson object to the use of purely statistical evidence to secure a conviction 
because in such a system, 'it would appear to be a crime to belong to a reference class' (2001: 172). 
They offer us this example to make their worry vivid:  
... let us suppose that 99 per cent of people from a certain 
reference class cheat on their taxes. Does this mean that we are 
justified in charging and sentencing someone in this class with tax 
evasion, without further evidence? No, of course not; we require 
more evidence than simply their membership in the reference 
class in question. It is important to note that we require further 
evidence not because we wish to raise the probability from 0.99 to 
something higher ... Rather, we require further evidence because 
the reference-class evidence is not specific to the individual in 
question (2001: 172). 
Something in this passage seems right. It shouldn't be a crime to belong to a reference class. 
There is also something very rhetorically effective about framing the issue this way. Having said 
that, I don’t know if this criticism is quite fair to those who defend Punish.  
 The philosophers who defend Punish don’t think that it should be a crime to belong to a 
reference class. They aren't suggesting that we alter the criminal statutes so that laws that made it 
a criminal offense to hide income make it a criminal offense to belong to a class composed 
almost entirely of people who hide income. The philosophers who defend punish think that 
there is a fallible but adequate test that we can use to decide whether to treat someone as guilty 
or not and they think that we should use statistical evidence in the test, not in the formulation of 
the law. 
Colyvan, Regan, and Ferson might respond by saying that this distinction between the 
formulation of the law and a test for its violation doesn’t come to much because the practical 
upshot of using a statistical test is the same.  That's true, but then it's not clear that this objection 
has much by way of dialectical significance. I don’t think the objection has much dialectical 
significance because it is hard to imagine an alternative practice to the one that uses statistical 
evidence that gives them what they desire—a basis for conviction that is specific to the 
individual in question in a way that statistical evidence is not.       
Most of the people who reject Punish accept a view on which juries are justified in 
convicting defendants on the basis of fallible evidence even when that evidence is misleading. 
Wrongful convictions are unfortunate, but on this way of thinking, jurors needn’t have failed to 
meet their obligations in convicting an innocent person on the basis of such evidence, provided 
that the evidential support is adequate.  Naturally, the notion of adequacy might be difficult to 
spell out, but consider Smith’s (2016) suggestion that evidence is adequate if it provides normic 
support (i.e., in normal worlds or circumstances, this evidence wouldn’t support a false belief).  
Would it be fair for someone who believes that jurors are justified in convicting the guilty and 
the innocent when they use evidence that provides normic support in the form of, say, 
eyewitness testimony or photographic evidence?  I think not.8  This normic support proposal 
																																																						
8  Smith (2016, forthcoming) defends this fallibilist view of justification. He is critical of Punish, 
but doesn't endorse the line of criticism discussed here. Smith's view is designed to vindicate the 
intuition that statistical evidence of the kind we have in Prisoners is not sufficient to justify belief 
by virtue of the fact that there are normal worlds in which we have this statistical evidence but 
end up forming a false belief. It is also designed to vindicate the intuition that evidence that 
provides normic support can justify belief even if the risk of such evidence leading us astray is 
greater than some statistical evidence that, on his view, wouldn't justify belief.  He embraces the 
conclusion that, say, experiential evidence can justify a belief even when it's more likely that 
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faces an objection nearly indistinguishable from Colyvan, Regan, and Ferson’s objection, which 
is that the view would ‘make it a crime’ to be the kind of person who could be convicted by 
juries who used evidence that provided normic support to reach their verdict.  But, surely, we 
might say, it cannot be a crime to be someone who is convicted on the basis of strong but 
misleading evidence!  It would seem that anyone who believes that there can be fallible evidence 
that justifies juries in convicting an innocent person faces a version of the problem that Colyvan, 
Regan, and Ferson point to. It would seem that just about everyone believes that such evidence 
can justify such convictions.9 If this is a problem for everyone, it really is a problem for nobody. 
Nobody (with the exception of the objectivists who think that it is always wrong to convict the 
innocent whatever evidence you have) thinks that the mere fact that a defendant is innocent is 
itself sufficient to determine that the conviction wasn’t justified.   
 
3.3 Thomson’s Guarantee  
In her discussion of the puzzle of the proper role of statistical evidence in the law, Thomson 
(1986) notes something that seems to be operative in the passage just quoted, which is that the 
purely statistical evidence seems to be not properly about or connected to the defendant. What 
we desire, she suggests, is evidence that is causally connected to the defendant in question.  On 
her view, just conviction requires individualized evidence, evidence that is causally connected to the 
defendant and the defendant's deeds in a way that statistical evidence wouldn't be. 
 Thomson's suggestions point us in the right general direction, but the rationale she offers 
for her view is problematic. Why should the law care about the difference between statistical 
evidence and individualized evidence? Thomson says two things about individualized evidence to 
convince us that we shouldn't convict without it. First, she says that such evidence can provide a 
guarantee that statistical evidence cannot. Second, she says that such evidence can be the basis 
for knowledge and that statistical evidence cannot.10 These points might be correct, but do these 
epistemological points support her objection to Punish? 
 Enoch, Fisher, and Spectre think that the law shouldn't concern itself with these 
epistemological matters:  
... why should the law of evidence care about knowledge or about 
epistemology more generally? It should care, undoubtedly, about 
truth, accuracy, and the avoidance of error. But why is it 
important that courts base their findings on knowledge? Insisting 
that the law should, after all, accord significant weight to 
knowledge or to epistemology in general amounts to a willingness 
to pay a price in accuracy. Indeed, excluding statistical evidence 
amounts to excluding what may be genuinely probative evidence. 
And this means that the legal value of knowledge—if it has legal 
																																																																																																																																																																								
beliefs based on this evidence are mistaken than it would be if they were based on some 
statistical evidence.   
9 This is in line with Schauer’s (2003: 86) suggestion that the problem that we’re dealing with isn’t 
about statistical evidence, per se, but about the use of nonuniversal indicators. Normic support 
would seem to be just one more nonuniversal indicator and while there might be reasons to 
think that some of these indicators are better suited to the task of a criminal trial, I don’t think 
that the point about reference class is helpful since we can create reference classes by reference 
to the classes picked out by the relevant indicators (e.g., the class of individuals who we could 
believe to cheat on their taxes using evidence that provides normic support). 
10 It is unclear what she means by a guarantee in this context. She might mean that it is a kind of 
connection to the truth that we would get from a causal connection. The context suggests that 
she thinks that such a connection is needed for knowledge and is missing in cases where we 
form beliefs based on statistical evidence alone.  
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value and if that value is what grounds the differential treatment 
of statistical and individual evidence—sometimes outweighs the 
value of accuracy; that, in other words, in order to make sure that 
courts base their ruling on knowledge, we are willing to tolerate 
more mistakes than we otherwise would have to and, in fact, a 
higher probability of mistake on this or that specific case. This 
just seems utterly implausible (2012). 
Thomson has a response, but I fear that it only serves to highlight the difficulty we face in trying 
to resist the argument for Punish:  
Our society takes the view that, in a criminal case, the loss to 
society if the defendant suffers the penalty for a crime he did not 
commit is very much greater than the loss to society if the 
defendant does not suffer the penalty for a crime he did commit 
... This point might be re-expressed as follows: our society takes 
the view that in a criminal case, the society's potential mistake-
loss is very much greater than the society's potential omission-
loss. It would be no wonder, then, if our law imposed a heavy 
standard of proof on the jury in a criminal case; and according to 
the friend of individualized evidence, that means the jury must be 
very sure of having a guarantee before imposing liability for a 
crime (1986: 215). 
In my view, this is a strange argument. We'd expect the proponents of Punish accept everything 
up to the last sentence.  Their argument is based on the same observations about value. These 
observations about value are observations they offer in support of Punish.  They'd say that the 
kind of guarantee that Thomson is after is either something the law shouldn't care about or 
something that the statistical evidence provides. It looks as if Thomson is saying that we 
shouldn't Punish because we recognize that the society's potential mistake-loss is greater than the 
society's potential omission-loss. The proponents of Punish would say that we should Punish 
because of these points about value, provided that the probability of guilt is sufficiently high. 
When the probability of guilt is sufficiently high, the proponents of Punish think that Punish 
best serves the very values that Thomson appeals to in arguing against Punish. Because she 
identifies no clear rationale for thinking that we should choose options that have less expected 
value than Punish, it isn't clear that there's any rationale here for insisting that it is never just to 
punish using statistical evidence.    
 There's something interesting about Thomson's response to the puzzle that I want to 
flag. She thinks that there is something epistemically bad about believing the defendant to be 
guilty and that this epistemological fact explains why Punish is mistaken. To meet the Enoch, 
Fisher, Spectre challenge, we have to show that the law should care about the epistemological 
matters that matter to Thomson.  We also have to show that Thomson's right about the 
epistemology. In the next section, we'll see that there's a prima facie plausible argument for 
thinking that there isn't anything epistemically wrong with believing the defendant to be guilty in 
Prisoners. 
 
4. An Argument for Believe  
Just as there is disagreement about whether to punish using statistical evidence, there is 
disagreement about whether such evidence justifies a full belief in guilt. There is a prima facie 
plausible argument for Believe that parallels the argument for Punish.  Believers want to acquire 
true beliefs and avoid false ones. Our desires and aversions reflect the epistemic value we assign 
to accurate and inaccurate belief. We can represent these values using a belief-matrix that looks 
similar to the decision-matrix from above:  
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Veritist Belief-Matrix 
 Guilty Innocent 
Believe  +1 -10 
Don't Believe 0 0 
 
If we accept a veritist view on which truth and falsity are the fundamental epistemic goods, we 
might say that it is a good thing to correctly believe the defendant to be guilty and a bad thing to 
mistakenly believe the defendant to be guilty.11 On this view, we could say that there is nothing 
good or bad that comes from having no belief.  If this matrix captures our epistemic values and 
we can assign probabilities to the states, we can determine what it takes to maximize expected 
epistemic value.  
 With this much in place, we can now offer an argument for Believe:   
An Argument for Believe 
P1'. Rationality requires us to maximize expected epistemic 
value.12 
P2'. Believe is the option that maximizes expected value.13  
P3'. So, rationality requires us to believe. 
P4'. It would be right to believe what rationality requires. 
P5'. So, it would be right to believe. 
If the argument for Believe is sound, this undermines the epistemological objections to Punish.14 
Readers should now see why I'm concerned with the extant case against Punish. It isn't clear 
which premise, if any, we should reject in the argument for Punish if we reject Believe. It isn't 
clear what right we have to assume that Believe is mistaken given that Believe appears to best 
serves our epistemic values. 
 
5. Moral Considerations 
We now have our arguments for Punish and Believe on the table.  If the reader’s moral 
sensibilities are anything like mine, they’ll be troubled by the suggestion that we can punish using 
statistical evidence. They might try to identify some moral principle that we would violate if we 
																																																						
11 For defenses of this view of epistemic value, see Lynch (2004). Some sophisticated veritists 
(e.g., Sylvan forthcoming) think that the fundamental epistemic goods are truth and falsity and 
also think that knowledge is better from the epistemic point of view than mere true belief. We 
will look at these views later. For a nuanced discussion that defends the view that knowledge is 
not better from the epistemic point of view than true belief, see Pritchard (forthcoming). 
12 This is assumed by many epistemic consequentialists. See Dorst (MS) and Easwaran (2016) for 
decision-theoretic justifications of Lockean views of rational belief. For defenses a quasi-
consequentialist justification approach to epistemic norms, see also Joyce (1999) and Pettigrew 
(2016).  For arguments that these quasi-consequentialist approaches are implausible because they 
would justify problematic tradeoffs, see Berker (2013), Firth (1981), Jenkins (2007), and 
Littlejohn (2012, 2015). Not everyone is impressed with this line of objection. See Ahlstrom-Vij 
and Dunn (2014) and Talbot (2014).  While I think that the quasi-consequentialist approach is 
problematic, my response to these arguments will focus on the veritist value theory, not the 
quasi-consequentialist norms.  
13 This is plausible if veritists like Joyce (1999) are right that accuracy and inaccuracy are the 
fundamental epistemic goods.   
14 Philosophers attracted to the Enkratic Requirement (i.e., the requirement that states that we 
should see to it that we φ when we believe that we ought to φ) should notice that they can use 
the Enkratic Requirement to connect Believe to Punish directly. If the Enkratic Requirement is 
correct, Punish couldn't be mistaken if Belief is correct.  For defenses of the Enkratic 
Requirement, see Gibbons (2013), Littlejohn (2012, forthcoming), and Titelbaum (2015).    
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were to punish in Prisoners.  I shall discuss three. I accept the first, but know that most readers 
do not share my objectivist instincts. Some readers might be attracted to the second, but I think 
it is problematic. My case against Punish ultimately rests on the third. We shall see that that this 
third argument is sound iff we can establish that Believe and Punish are connected and that 
Believe is mistaken. 
 
5.1 Never the Innocent 
Because I have objectivist instincts, I think that we should conform to this norm:   
Never the Innocent: It isn't permissible to punish people for 
crimes they didn't commit. 
This norm is an objectivist norm in the sense that it has an objective application condition (i.e., 
one that doesn't supervene upon our subjective states, individually or collectively as jurors).  This 
norm follows from a standard reading of a knowledge norm that states that we should not 
convict a defendant unless we know them to be guilty.15 
 If Never the Innocent is a genuine norm, the primary argument for Punish must be 
unsound.16 To see why, think think about what happens if we selected the one innocent prisoner.  
If our defendant had been innocent we would still maximize expected value by punishing the 
defendant. Thus, the argument for Punish is, inter alia, an argument for violating Never the 
Innocent. Since Never the Innocent is a norm we shouldn't violate, we should reject Punish.  
 
5.2 Capped Convictions 
Unfortunately, most readers probably don't find the previous argument convincing because it 
rests on the objectivist assumption that the defendant’s innocence is sufficient to establish that it 
would be wrong to punish. They might think that there is something in the neighborhood of this 
argument against Punish, however, that works. Notice that if the argument for Punish works in 
one case, it would work in each case. If it worked in each case, we'd have a case for thinking that 
we should punish 100 prisoners. This, however, might seem outrageous. It might seem 
outrageous to punish 100 people for 99 crimes.  
 This argument assumes this intuitively plausible principle:  
Capped Convictions: It is never permissible to knowingly punish 
N people for N-1 offenses.17  
While the argument that appeals to this principle might initially seem promising, I doubt that this 
argument could succeed if we are right to reject objectivist norms like Never the Innocent.1819 
																																																						
15 See Blome-Tillman (MS) for a defense of this objectivist norm. 
16 For defenses of this kind of objectivist principle, see Littlejohn (2012). 
17 Peter Dennis first raised this objection during a presentation of Katie Steele (MS). I initially 
thought the objection was decisive but was brought around by discussions with Julien Dutant, 
Martin Smith, and Katie Steele.   
18 Much in the way that consistency norms follow from truth norms, Never the Innocent 
vindicates Capped Convictions. Thus, if you thought that Never the Innocent was a genuine 
norm, you would have to accept Capped Convictions.  
19 An anonymous referee noted that there is a variant argument for Punish that Never the 
Innocent does not block. The argument starts from the observation that it is very probable that 
you should believe the defendant to be guilty. With this assumption and the further assumption 
that it is very probable that you should do something if it is very probable that you should 
believe you should do it, we get the result that it is very probable that you ought to punish the 
prisoner. In the later sections, I shall argue that it is not very probable that you should believe the 
defendant to be guilty on the grounds that probable truth is sufficient for neither a justification 
to believe nor for making it probable that you should believe a proposition. That is because, as 
we’ll see, it might be very probable that p and yet you might know that nobody could know 
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 To see why, remember that the people who reject Punish think that we're sometimes 
justified in punishing defendants. They would presumably accept some principle along these 
lines:  
Any Sure Offender: It is permissible to punish a defendant when 
we justifiably believe the defendant to be guilty.20 
This case shows that Any Sure Offender should lead us to reject Capped Convictions: 
Prisoners II  
100 prisoners have been convicted. In each case, the juries relied 
on adequate evidence for the belief that the defendant was guilty. 
After the convictions were carried out, a perfectly reliable 
observer tells you that precisely 1 of these people had been 
framed. Alas, your informant dies before he can identify the 
person.21 
While the objectivists who accept Never the Innocent could say that there is precisely one 
person in Prisoners 2 who should be freed (and one person who never should have been 
convicted), we're operating under the assumption that this objectivist view is mistaken. If we 
accept Any Sure Offender, we'll have to reject Capped Convictions. The testimony might put us 
in a position to know that there are only 99 guilty people in the cells but this doesn't prevent us 
from justifiably believing in each of the 100 cases that the particular defendant we're considering 
is guilty. 
 
5.3 Reasonable Conviction   
To my mind, the strongest (non-objectivist) objection to Punish focuses on the relationship 
between belief and punishment.  
Remember our first matrix, the Veritist Decision-Matrix. To determine whether Punish 
maximizes expected value, we needed to know the probability of guilt and the values of 
<Punish, Innocent> and <Punish, Guilty>.  For some assignments of value, the probability of 
guilt has to be very high for Punish to maximize expected value. If it's at all plausible to think 
that it's rational to believe a proposition when its probability on the evidence is sufficiently high, 
it might seem that rational beliefs about guilt and rational decisions about whether to punish will 
go hand in hand. The crucial point to notice, however, is that this correlation doesn't hold for 
many possible value assignments to <Punish, Innocent> and <Punish, Guilty>.   
 Blackstone said that it is better that ten guilty persons walk free than one innocent 
person suffers. Franklin said that it would be better that one hundred should walk free than one 
innocent person be sent to prison. With numbers like these, there's some correlation between 
the punishment that maximizes expected value and high probability of guilt. Voltaire, however, 
thought that it was much more prudent to let two guilty persons walk free than to let one person 
suffer. With numbers like this, we lose the connection between high probability and guilt.  If 
readers prefer the views of Joseph Stalin or Dwight Schrute, they'd think that it would be better 
that hundreds if not millions of innocent people be jailed than it would be to let one guilty 
person walk free. On these assignments of value, the justification of punishment wouldn't require 
the probability of guilt to be particularly high.  
																																																																																																																																																																								
whether p. When you know this, I think that it is settled that you should not believe p and that it 
is not probable that you should believe p.   
20 We should assume that this principle uses a non-factive notion of justification so that it could 
recommend convicting someone who is innocent if, say, we had the right kind of evidence for 
believing the defendant to be guilty. 
21 The adequacy of evidence has to be understood in such a way that it is possible to have 
adequate evidence to believe falsely that the defendant is guilty. 
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 This points to a general concern.  Let's say that the probability of the defendant's guilt is 
at the practical threshold iff the expected value of Punish is equal to the expected value of Don't 
Punish.  The probability of the defendant's guilt is at the epistemic threshold iff the expected value 
of Believe is equal to that of Don't Believe.  In setting out the case for Punish, it seems that none 
of the operative assumptions would ensure that the practical threshold is at least as high as the 
epistemic threshold.  If we accept the epistemological assumptions operative in the argument for 
Believe, we would be committed to the view that it is reasonable to believe (outright) that the 
defendant is guilty if the probability of guilt is at least as high as the epistemic threshold and that 
it would be unreasonable otherwise.  Thus, it's possible that the best argument for Punish is an 
argument that we ought to Punish even if we know that it's unreasonable to believe that the 
defendant is guilty. 
 To block this, someone could argue that if we plug the right values into the Veritist 
Decision-Matrix, the practical threshold is very high, high enough to match or surpass the 
epistemic threshold.  I have two worries about this response. First, it wouldn't be in keeping with 
the view to insist that, say, Franklin's numbers were in the right ballpark on the grounds that it 
raised the practical threshold to a level that would satisfy our epistemic scruples (i.e., a point at 
which the probability of guilt is sufficiently high to convince us that outright belief in the 
defendant's guilt would be reasonable).  Our assignment of values to the Veritist Decision-Matrix 
wasn't initially driven by epistemological concerns (e.g., a concern that the practical threshold is 
too low to ensure that jurors who rightly convict a defendant could reasonably believe the 
defendant to be guilty).  We were supposed to justify a decision to convict without appeal to 
epistemological considerations by focusing on the values we wanted our criminal trials to 
promote. If we want the decision-matrix to reflect these values, we might need to appeal to 
assumptions about reasonable belief that haven't yet played any explicit role in the discussion.  In 
turn, we might think there was something wrong with the way we initially framed the decision 
problem. Second, we might reject the very idea that the epistemic threshold represents 
something significant when it comes to rational full belief. If we accept the argument for Believe, 
we might think that this threshold represents the weakest level of support at which it is rational 
to believe and we might then wonder how this point relates to the practical threshold. If, 
however, we reject the Lockean view of rational belief, we might worry that it could be irrational 
or unreasonable to believe a defendant to be guilty even if the probability of guilt exceeds both 
the practical and epistemic threshold.  
 Can the proponents of Punish give us any reason to think that they can vindicate this 
norm?  
Reasonable Conviction: It is not permissible to punish a 
defendant if it isn't reasonable to believe the defendant to be 
guilty. 
I don't think that they can. If the potential loss to the defendant is small enough or the 
importance of punishing the guilty is great enough, we should expect that there could be 
situations where it is irrational to believe outright that the defendant is guilty even though Punish 
would maximize expected value (as characterized by the Veritist Decision-Matrix). If the 
proponents of Punish had said up front that they were defending a view on which we can be 
required to punish a defendant even when we know it would be unreasonable to believe outright 
that the defendant to be guilty, their argument wouldn't have had the persuasive force it initially 
appeared to have.  I think that if a member of the jury, say, told us that they were going to vote 
to convict in spite of the fact that they thought they had to suspend judgment on whether the 
defendant was guilty, we wouldn’t be impressed by their use of a decision-matrix to show that 
Punish maximized expected value.22      
																																																						
22 An anonymous referee asked why this is. Why wouldn’t it be enough that the agent was just 
very confident that the defendant was guilty? I shall explain why in the next section. The 
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If the proponents of Punish try to show that Punish maximizes expected value only 
when the probability of guilt is very high, we might reasonably worry that their axiology was 
being driven by epistemological considerations. If that's how things should work, the law should 
take an interest in the epistemological considerations that Enoch, Fisher, and Spectre thought 
shouldn't interest the law. It also looks like the initial Veritist Decision-Matrix would be too 
crude to take account of the values we want to plug in (e.g., the matrix doesn't distinguish 
between the case where we convict the guilty while irrationally believing them to be guilty and 
the case where we convict while reasonably believing the defendant to be guilty). Once we let the 
epistemic considerations help determine which values should go into our matrix, we should insist 
on a matrix that divides up the states and options differently. 
 Since the primary argument for Punish is an argument that succeeds only if it would 
show that it would be right to punish someone who we know we could not reasonably believe to 
be guilty, I think we know there is something wrong with the rationale offered in support of 
Punish.  
Why should we think this?  I don’t think it’s because we’re convinced that the right 
values are closer to something like the values Franklin suggested. We don’t come to this issue 
thinking that the right values to plug into the cell must ensure that Punish only maximizes 
expected value when the practical and epistemic threshold match.  I think we are troubled by the 
rationale offered for Punish because on a proper understanding of the values at play, the values 
we assign to our cells are sensitive to epistemological considerations. The Veritist Decision-
Matrix doesn’t reflect this, but this is a reason to think that there’s something wrong with the 
way the issue has been framed.  The debate has been framed as one in which one side thinks that 
we ought to punish because we ought to maximize expected value and the other side thinks that 
we shouldn’t punish even though they seem to grant that Punish does maximize expected value. 
It was a mistake to do so.  I shall have more to say about this and alternative decision matrices in 
§7.  
My main argument against Punish can be stated as follows:  
The Argument against Punish 
A1. It would be wrong to punish the defendant in Prisoners if 
we could not rationally believe the defendant to be guilty. 
A2. Given the grounds in Prisoners, we could not rationally 
believe the defendant to be guilty. 
Ac. Thus, it would be wrong to punish the defendant in 
Prisoners.  
The first premise, (A1), is just Reasonable Conviction. The second premise is an epistemological 
claim that we’ll discuss below. 
 Some would likely say that if Reasonable Conviction supports an argument against 
Punish, it wouldn’t be a genuine principle. If the principle supports the case for Punish, wouldn’t 
it tell us that we shouldn’t maximize expected value? Don’t we have good reason to think that 
we ought to maximize expected value and thus violate putative principles that would tell us to do 
otherwise? If so, it clearly calls for justification.   
 This is a fair request. My defense of Reasonable Conviction begins with a reminder that 
punishment is an act that differs in an important way from acts like betting on football matches 
or taking umbrellas.23  This is because punishment is supposed to be a way of holding someone 
																																																																																																																																																																								
important point is that deciding to punish isn’t like deciding to take an umbrella. For reasons 
that I shall discuss below, reactive attitudes and affective responses make a difference here and 
force us to see a difference between betting on the guilt or innocence of a defendant and 
punishing a guilty defendant.   
23 Adler (2002) and Buchak (2013) have argued that the grounds needed for blame differ from 
the grounds needed for betting. A high degree of confidence might make it rational to bet on 
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accountable and it involves a backwards-looking element that other actions often lack. Thus, the 
act in question (e.g., imposing a prison sentence) has to be guided by certain kinds of 
consideration to be a punishment.  If Agnes’ reason for harming Jack couldn’t be anything to do 
with what Jack has done, Agnes’ act wouldn’t properly be described as punishment.  Thus, we 
need to foreground something that has been left in the background too long. If we have a 
system of rules that governs decisions to punish or to refrain from punishing, it would seem that 
the rules should require that the decision to impose the harms associated with punishment be 
made only when the punishment can properly express blame or at least treat the defendant as 
accountable for some specific deed. It would not be proper to blame unless the relevant parties 
could properly believe that the defendant did something blameworthy. This is why we shouldn’t 
adopt rules that tell us to make a decision that would be expected to harm a defendant on the 
basis of considerations of expected value if the agents imposing those harms couldn’t also 
believe something about the defendant’s guilt.  Recall at the beginning that I said that any just 
system of punishment would have to have a backwards-looking element. It would have to have 
something that would ensure that there was a prohibition against imposing the harms by 
convicting for any reason that didn’t include the defendant’s guilt.24    
 This is why I think that it’s plausible that a norm like Reasonable Conviction should be 
operative in criminal trials. There is no obstacle to justifying acts like taking an umbrella or 
making a bet by appeal to considerations of expected value because the justification of these acts 
doesn’t turn on whether the agent has any specific full beliefs about the situation.  An agent can 
justifiably take an umbrella because they believe outright that it is raining, but they could also 
take an umbrella because they fear that it might and have a strong aversion to getting wet on the 
way to work. When we’re dealing with acts that have an expressive dimension, the justification of 
the act turns, in part, upon the justification of the relevant accompanying attitudes. Without the 
relevant attitudes, no act could serve that expressive function. Without a belief in the defendant’s 
guilt, we could not act in a way that would express blame. Our actions wouldn’t be ways of 
holding the defendant to account. We would (hopefully) object to the suggestion that the jury 
would rightly conclude that a defendant should be forced to suffer a harm if we didn’t think that 
the defendant was guilty of the act that was supposed to merit the punishment. 
 
6. Believe? 
If Reasonable Conviction is a genuine norm, my argument against Punish will succeed iff Believe 
is mistaken. If we can reasonably believe that the defendant in Prisoners is guilty, there is no 
principled objection to conviction. If, however, it’s not reasonable to believe the defendant to be 
																																																																																																																																																																								
Chelsea (depending upon the odds) even if this high degree of confidence doesn't amount to full 
belief.  (Moreover, a low degree of confidence could also make it rational to bet if the odds are 
right.) A degree of confidence that doesn't amount to full belief does not rationalize reactive 
attitudes like resentment. As Adler memorably puts the point, 'Mild resentment is never 
resentment caused by what one judges to be a serious offense directed toward oneself tempered 
by one’s degree of uncertainty in that judgment' (2002: 217). None of this is surprising if we see 
knowledge as required for factive emotion. See Dietz (forthcoming) and Gordon (1987).       
24 As an anonymous referee pointed out, a focus on blame might be too specific for my 
purposes.  We can offer an account that parallels Buchak's (2013) even if punishment does not 
involve blame. All that matters for our purposes is that punishment is like blame in that it 
involves a backwards-looking element. The crucial idea is that this backwards-looking element is 
responsible for the crucial dependence of the response (i.e., blame, punishment) upon certain 
specific beliefs about the situation (e.g., the agent's deeds, the agent's attitudes at the time of 
action). If, say, punishment involves at least some backwards-looking element, it isn't surprising 
that the justification of it might depend, in part, upon the justification of certain specific 
motivating beliefs.  
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guilty, Reasonable Conviction tells us that it would be wrong to punish even if Punish turns out 
to be the best option on the Veritist Decision-Matrix.  
 In this section, we’ll look at three approaches to rational belief to try to determine 
whether Believe is correct. 
 
6.1 Veritism and the Lockean View 
The argument for Believe should appeal to Lockeans about rational belief (i.e., those who think 
that a full belief is rational iff it is rational for the thinker to have a sufficiently high degree of 
confidence). The argument shows that we maximize expected epistemic value (characterized in 
terms of accuracy and inaccuracy) iff we believe the defendant to be guilty on the basis of the 
statistical evidence.  
There are serious problems with this Lockean conception of rational belief and the quasi-
consequentialist arguments that support it. The Lockean view doesn't vindicate the intuitions 
that many of us have about beliefs about lotteries and beliefs based on testimony. While I don't 
think that it's rational to believe (fully) that a ticket in some lottery lost when that belief is based 
on statistical evidence, it can be rational to believe what a reliable newspaper reports even when 
it's more likely that the paper errs in this entry than it is that the ticket wins.25  
I wouldn’t expect these considerations to trouble the Lockean, but perhaps the second 
problem will cause more concern. There are certain 'bad' propositions that we know that we 
cannot know where these propositions are at least as probable on the evidence as propositions 
that the Lockean takes to be rational to believe. Suppose we know, for example, that we cannot 
know whether lottery propositions are true. It doesn't seem rational to believe this: I don't know 
if my ticket lost, but it did. There is a kind of incoherence or clash present here in which the 
thinker seems to be both putting it forward that they were aware of something while affirming 
that they are not.  In spite of the apparent irrationality of believing this, the proposition should 
be as probable on my evidence as the proposition that my ticket lost. Thus, on the Lockean 
view, it seems that these propositions should be equally rational to believe.  If they want to 
vindicate the intuition that it's not rational to believe the Moorean absurdity, they have to raise 
the probability threshold necessary for rational belief to absurdly high levels. If they use quasi-
consequentialist reasoning to test epistemic norms, they would have to modify their value theory 
in such a way that they'd show an aversion to risk that is pathological. It’s worth pointing out 
here that if it’s irrational to believe Moorean absurdities (e.g., that God hates my atheism, that 
my ticket will lose but I don’t know if it will), it’s irrational to believe that which we know we 
cannot know. If rationality doesn’t permit us to believe both conjuncts, it won’t allow you to 
believe one conjunct (e.g., my ticket will lose) by trying by hook or by crook to suppress the 
knowledge that this isn’t something you’re in a position to know. 
It also seems that the Lockean view will never vindicate our intuitions about cases like 
Prisoners and Prisoners II. In Prisoners II, it's rational to believe that some randomly selected 
prisoner was guilty. In Prisoners, it is not. From the Lockean perspective, the two cases should 
be on par since the truth of both beliefs is highly probable on the evidence. It seems that our 
intuitions draw distinctions between cases that don’t pattern with differences in the probability 
of the relevant beliefs. 
In short, the Lockean view tells us a plausible story about what rational belief would be 
like if we accepted a veritist theory of epistemic value and thought that rational belief, like 
rational action, is rational because of how it promotes that value, but I fear that the view’s 
verdicts are implausible in a number of cases. While it is clear that there is a Lockean argument 
for Believe, I don’t think we should accept the Lockean approach.  
 
6.2 Defeatism 
																																																						
25 I think this observation is first due to Harman (1968). 
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While some veritists are attracted to the Lockean view, some would argue that the Lockean 
account runs into trouble because it doesn’t take account of potential defeaters that could make 
it irrational to believe highly probable propositions. To undermine the case for Believe, some 
readers might be tempted by some such defeatist response. A defeatist would say that there is 
some sort of epistemic principle that provides us with a defeater that defeats the justification 
provided by the thinker's evidence in cases like Punish. Concerning Prisoners, the defeatist could 
say that while we can rationally be very confident that the defendant is guilty we cannot 
justifiably or reasonably believe that a defendant is guilty because this belief would violate this 
principle:  
Avoid Falsity Principle: For any set L of competing statements, if 
(i) a person S has good reason to believe each member of L is 
true and (ii) either S has good reason to believe at least one 
member of L is false or S is justified in suspending judgment 
about whether at least one member of L is false, then S is not 
justified in believing any of the competing individual members of 
L (Ryan 1996: 130).  
As in standard lottery cases, Prisoners is a case in which we know that if we believe every claim 
supported by the strong statistical evidence we will believe one falsehood. Thus, the Avoid 
Falsity Principle tells us that we cannot rationally believe any of the defendants to be guilty. This 
would show that Believe is mistaken. In turn, I could appeal to Reasonable Conviction to show 
that Punish is mistaken.  
 While I think that this defeatist verdict concerning Believe is correct and that we ought 
to reject the Lockean view that says that high probability of truth is sufficient for justified belief, 
I think the defeatist response suffers from two problems. The first is that it seems to deliver the 
wrong verdict in preface-type cases. By my lights, it delivers the right verdict in Prisoners, but 
the wrong verdict in Prisoners II. It is like the Lockean view in treating these cases equally but 
what we want is a view that treats them differently.26 In Prisoners II, it seems plausible that the 
thinker is justified in believing each prisoner to be guilty even though the Avoid Falsity Principle 
predicts that this justification should be defeated. Much in the way that it seems to be an 
overreaction to the discovery that one prisoner was framed to release all the prisoners, it seems 
to be an overreaction to the discovery of error to suspend judgment on a large set of 
propositions each of which is a good candidate for knowledge or for knowledge-level 
justification.   
 The second problem with the defeatist line is that the principle is likely to strike people 
as ad hoc.  There is something compelling about what Horowitz says about rationality:  
... a rational agent should be doing well by her own lights, in a 
particular way: roughly speaking, she should follow the epistemic 
rule that she rationally takes to be most truth-conducive. It would 
be irrational, the thought goes, to regard some epistemic rule as 
more truth-conducive than one’s own, but not adopt it (2014: 43). 
If the values in the Veritist Belief-Matrix are our values, doesn't it seem that these values are best 
served by a set of rules that tolerates inconsistency in large sets of beliefs? The defeatist doesn’t 
go far enough because the defeatist doesn’t question the veritist assumptions that underwrite the 
arguments for the Lockean view. We know that the rules that tolerate belief based on statistical 
evidence, if followed, would do a better job leading us to form true beliefs and avoid false ones 
than alternative sets of rules that includes rules like the Avoid Falsity Principle. It thus seems that 
it would be irrational for someone with the veritist's values to adhere to that principle.  The 
																																																						
26 Ryan (1996) offers a defeatist treatment of preface-type cases. For defenses of rational 
inconsistency, see Christensen (2004) and Easwaran and Fitelson (2015), My defense of rational 
inconsistency appeals to Bird's (2007) knowledge-first theory of rational belief. See below. 
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parallel with the practical case is instructive here. (This echoes my concern about Thomson's 
rationale for thinking that just punishment requires a guarantee from individualized evidence.) I 
don't think that many people would think that a rational actor would accept some analog of the 
Avoid Falsity Principle and use that to guide their choices (e.g., by refusing to convict any 
defendant in cases like Prisoners II or refusing to make a dutch book against someone because 
they knew that this sure-win strategy would require losing a bet). 
    
6.3 Gnosticism 
We've looked at two views of rational belief.  They offer different verdicts concerning Believe, 
but I think that they’re problematic because they don’t distinguish Prisoners from Prisoners II. 
Luckily, there is an alternative. 
In discussing the Lockean and defeatist views, we assumed a veritist value theory on 
which accuracy and inaccuracy are the fundamental values.  With this evaluative framework in 
place, we seem forced to choose between an approach that identifies justification with high 
probability or a framework that introduces defeaters that seem ad hoc and would appear to defeat 
too much justification. We should consider an alternative approach to epistemic value.   
Instead of treating accuracy and inaccuracy as the fundamental epistemic goods and evils, 
the gnostic treats knowledge and failed attempts at knowing as the fundamental epistemic values.27 
Because there are beliefs that are highly probable on the evidence that we know aren’t things that 
we can know (e.g., lottery propositions, Moorean absurdities), the gnostic isn’t tempted to say 
that these beliefs are justified or rationally held. If we know apriori that such beliefs are 
epistemically disvaluable, we don’t need to introduce defeaters to explain why we shouldn’t hold 
them.  
We know why the gnostics wouldn’t think of high probability as sufficient for rationality, 
but we don’t know yet what they take rational belief to be. There are at least two promising 
approaches to consider. Nothing in this paper would turn on which approach we pursued. One 
approach would be similar to the veritist Lockean view in that it would say that a rational belief 
is rational because it maximizes expected epistemic value. It differs from the veritist-motivated 
Lockean view because it would tell us that the rational status of a belief turns on the probability 
on the thinker’s evidence that the belief would be knowledge, not (just) on the probability on the 
thinker’s evidence that the belief would be accurate. Suppose we thought that knowledge required 
some modal condition (e.g., safety, sensitivity) or some causal condition that connects that which 
makes the belief true to the belief itself. In lottery-type cases, we would know that high 
probability of accuracy and high probability of constituting knowledge would come apart 
because the target belief wouldn’t meet the relevant modal or causal condition. In such cases, the 
gnostic thinks we ought to suspend judgment in spite of the high probability of the target belief 
being true.  
There are alternative approaches to rational belief that the gnostic might consider. Recall 
Bird’s suggestion that rational belief is a kind of counterpat of knowledge: 
Knowledge is epistemically central. Justified belief is a certain 
kind of approximation to knowledge. It is an approximation that 
is independent of one’s mental states. If one attempts to know 
but fails for some reason that is located outside one’s mental 
states then one’s belief is justified. But if one’s failure to know is 
due to some feature internal to one’s other mental states, then the 
judgment is not justified (Bird 2007: 84). 
																																																						
27 This seems to be in line with Sosa's (2015) view on which the fundamental bearers of 
epistemic value are attempts understood as beliefs that aim at the truth. I shall have more to say 
about this view in the final section of the paper.   
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Whenever your beliefs constitute knowledge, they are rationally held. If you believe but don't 
know, your beliefs will count as rational if the failure to know isn't down to the way that you've 
exercised your rational capacities. In lottery cases, the failure to know is internal to the thinker’s 
mental states—their belief is supported by the wrong kind of considerations. In preface cases, 
however, there is no such failure to point to—every belief in the preface-type case might be an 
approximation to knowledge.  
The differences between these two ways of developing a gnostic view of rational belief 
shouldn’t matter for our purposes because they both agree that if we know apriori that our belief 
in p could not constitute knowledge, we know apriori that we cannot rationally believe p.  Both of 
these approaches give us a principled basis for rejecting Believe.  
 Gnosticism fares better than the veritist Lockean view or the defeatist view because the 
gnostic sees some accurate states of mind as states that realize the fundamental epistemic evil 
and fail to realize any sort of compensating epistemic good. Concerning the epistemic options in 
Prisoners, for example, gnostics could offer us this revised matrix: 
 
Gnostic Belief-Matrix 
 Known Guilt Unknown Guilt Innocent 
Believe +1 -10 -10 
Don't Believe 0 0  0 
 
With a matrix like this, the case for Believe isn’t just blocked; we have a case against Believe.28 
Given the gnostic account of epistemic value, Don't Believe does better than Believe. 
 This chart summarizes the verdicts of the three approaches to rational belief considered 
thus far: 
 
 Lottery/Prisoners Preface/Prisoners 2 Moorean Absurdities 
Lockean Rational Rational Rational 
Defeatist Not Rational Not Rational ? 
Gnostic Not Rational Rational Not Rational 
 
The defeatist gets lottery propositions and Prisoners right, but the tool that it uses to justify 
these verdicts is too crude. The defeaters introduced prevent us from distinguishing the lottery 
from the preface or Prisoners from Prisoners II.  The Lockean view is too crude, too. It gets the 
preface and Prisoners II right, but it also doesn’t distinguish between these cases and the lottery 
or Prisoners.  The gnostic has no trouble distinguishing between these cases because those in the 
first column are things we know apriori cannot be known and those in the second column are 
plausible candidates for knowledge. The gnostic approach is the only view we’ve seen that gets 
all the cases right. It explains why we should reject Believe and so why we should reject the first 
premise in the ancillary argument for Punish.  
 
7. The Gnostic Solution(s) 
One reason that the primary argument for Punish and the argument for Believe seem compelling 
is that these arguments seem to simply combine some observations about the things we value 
with some norms taken from decision-theory and churn out a result. If these values are our 
																																																						
28 An anonymous referee asked whether it is plausible to think of true beliefs that fail to 
constitute knowledge and false beliefs as having the same disvalue. I think that the answer is 
‘Yes’ because both beliefs fail to do what full beliefs are supposed to do, which is to put us in a 
position to believe, feel, and do things for a reason that is constituted by a fact that the knowing 
agent has in mind. All that matters for our purposes, though, is that it is worse to believe and fail 
to know than it is to suspend.  
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values and we don’t want to bet against decision-theory, it seems we are stuck with Believe and 
Punish. It appears, for example, that Punish is a straightforward case of decision under risk. We 
know the probabilities and the values of the outcomes. The objectively best and worst outcomes 
are uncertain, so it seems that we should just stick to the rule that says that we maximize 
expected value. The problem with appealing to norms like Reasonable Conviction is precisely 
that it seems to require that we act against this rule.   
 It is this apparent clash between a norm like Reasonable Conviction and the norms of 
decision theory that made it difficult to see how Tribe and Thomson rejected Punish. I would 
now like to suggest that there is a way in which this clash is merely apparent. If we think that the 
values that the law ought to care about are those that figure in the Veritist Decision-Matrix or 
Belief-Matrix, the clash would be real and we would have to choose between Reasonable 
Conviction and maximizing expected value.  If, however, the values that the law ought to care 
about are those that figure in a Gnostic Decision-Matrix, there is no clash:  
       
 Gnostic Decision-Matrix 
 Known Guilt Unknown Guilt Innocent 
Punish +1 -10 -10 
Don't Punish -1 0  0 
 
If we frame our decision problem in this way, the norm that tells us to maximize expected value 
tells us that we shouldn’t punish. Given these values, this norm delivers the same verdict as 
Reasonable Conviction. Indeed, the decision problem is, from this point of view, not a case of 
decision under risk. For this to be a case of decision under risk, there has to be uncertainty about 
which outcome is objectively best. There isn’t. We know apriori that we’re in a case where 
nothing good could come from Punish and that we are certain to avoid a bad outcome if we 
choose Don’t Punish. 
 If I’m right in suggesting that the right values are closer to those contained in the 
Gnostic Decision-Matrix, we see that the problem with the primary argument for Punish is not 
the application of norms from decision theory, but some assumptions about value that hadn’t 
been questioned in earlier discussions of the problem posed by the use of statistical evidence in 
criminal trials.  Readers will undoubtedly want to know why we should think that the law ought 
to care about the difference between punishing someone known to be guilty and punishing 
someone when there is a very high probability of guilt. 
 My answer to this question draws on an observation from §5. Recall Reasonable 
Conviction. While the criminal trial is designed to help identify the guilty and screen out the 
innocent, it isn’t concerned with just the efficient and reliable sorting of people into groups. In 
one outcome of the process, the defendant is held accountable for some wrong that they’ve 
committed. The imposition of punishment is supposed to serve this function and the actions 
that serve this function are not just the actions that result in a reliable distribution of defendants 
into the right piles. Thus, the trial process should be regulated to ensure that if the trial is 
properly resolved with a decision to punish this punishment could fulfill the relevant expressive 
function. It can do so if the relevant agent’s reason for imposing some harm is the fact that the 
defendant is guilty of the offense. It cannot do that, however, if that fact could not be the agent’s 
reason, say, for imprisoning someone. An agent cannot blame someone for having done 
something if they know that they don’t know that the defendant did the deed. This is because an 
agent's reason cannot be something they know they do not know.  
 The law should assign different values to two possible outcomes of a criminal trial:  
(a) Knowingly inflicting harm upon someone who cannot be 
blamed for wrongdoing;  
(b) Knowingly inflicting harm upon someone who can be 
blamed for wrongdoing. 
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It is a perversion of the process to impose harm upon someone when we aren’t in a position to 
hold the person accountable for her deeds. Notice that the original Veritist Decision-Matrix 
lumps these two outcomes together. If I’m right about Believe, the success of their argument for 
Punish turns on lumping these two things together. (If they were to concede, for example, that 
it’s not reasonable to believe in Prisoners that the defendant is guilty, they would have to 
concede that it’s not reasonable to blame the defendant in this case. If they conceded that and 
then assigned different values to (a) and (b), they would need to modify their decision-matrix so 
that it more closely resembled the Gnostic Decision-Matrix.) 
 Where does knowledge enter the picture?  It can enter the picture in two ways. It matters 
whether the agents responsible for decisions about conviction and punishment are able to make 
a decision to impose the harms for the reason that the defendant committed some offense.29 If they 
cannot do this, it isn’t reasonable to blame. If they can do this, it is reasonable to blame. On the 
first way of bringing knowledge into the picture, we appeal to the idea that an agent’s action can 
only be captured by a propositionally specified reason if the agent knows the proposition in 
question.30  If we go this route, we can say that the reason that the law ought to assign different 
values to <Punish, Known Guilt> and <Punish, Unknown Guilt> is that it’s only when the 
agent knows that the defendant did the deed that the agent’s reason for imposing the harms 
could be the fact that the defendant did the deed. If the agent acts without this knowledge, the 
agent’s reason could not be that the defendant did the deed. This, in turn, would be a misuse of 
the powers associated with the criminal process and should be regarded as a bad outcome in the 
eyes of the law. 
 On the second way of bringing knowledge into the picture, we don’t need to appeal to 
the idea that it’s only possible for the agent’s reason to be that p if they know that p. Instead, we 
could appeal to the idea that the agent’s reason couldn’t be p if the agent knows they don’t know 
																																																						
29 An anonymous referee voiced an objection to this idea, saying, “our whole penal system seems 
built on the falsity of the first claim – that we should punish only when it is, inter alia, for the 
reason the defendant did the crime. Our punishment regime, and nearly any one imaginable in a 
large society, is designed to punish at least some merely because they probably did it.” One way 
to address this point (also noted by the referee) was that we could appeal to Moss’ (forthcoming) 
idea that we can have probabilistic knowledge.  This is one way to go and I should stress here 
that I’m trying to motivate a general approach, not some highly specific account. I did want the 
word ‘matters’ to operate as a kind of hedge above. One way that knowledge could matter is that 
we have a standard that says that we convict iff we know the defendant to be guilty. This would 
give use the desired result in Prisoners, but it would clash with the referee’s observation about 
the role of probability in the criminal justice system. I think it’s an interesting question whether 
the system that the referee defends is one that we should accept. (Part of this goes back to the 
earlier issue about objectivism about norms that I wanted to bracket.) We could say that 
knowledge matters in a different way—the difference in value for <Known Guilt, Punish> and 
<Unknown Guilt, Punish> tells us something about the values realized by outcomes—that they 
are sensitive to the presence or absence of knowledge. This evaluative claim doesn’t tell us when 
it’s right to convict. For that we need a norm that tells us how to respond to this value. We could 
try to vindicate the referee’s observations by adopting a view on which these values and 
probabilities concerning what the agent knows will determine what the agent ought to do. In 
other words, we could make room for just conviction of defendants who are in fact innocent if 
we say that what we ought to do is maximize expected value as characterized by the gnostic.  
This would build on some ideas of Dutant (forthcoming). I see a number of interesting avenues 
to pursue and I hope that readers don’t assume that I’m assuming here that we need knowledge 
of the defendant’s guilt to rightly punish. I assume that such knowledge is required for the ideal 
outcome to obtain.   
30 For defense, see Alvarez (2010), Hyman (2015), and Unger (1975). 
 21 
whether p. If the agent knows or appears to know, say, that the defendant did some deed, their 
motive for acting could still be one that pertains to some offense that the law cares about. If, 
however, the agent neither knows nor appears to know that the defendant did some deed, the 
proper specification of the reasons for which they act wouldn’t be that the defendant did some 
deed. As before, to impose the harms associated with punishment while conceding that the 
defendant might not have committed the offense in question would be a misuse of the powers 
associated with the criminal law. The law should see this as a bad outcome.  
 Because the law should care about the difference between (a) and (b), it ought to assign 
different values to imposing harms upon those we know (or seem to know) committed some 
offense and the imposition of harms upon those who we don’t even seem to know committed 
that offense. The Gnostic Decision-Matrix reflects this. The Veritist Decision-Matrix does not. 
If you plug in bad values, it shouldn’t be all that surprising that the norms from decision theory 
won’t necessarily deliver good verdicts. If you plug in the right values, however, it won’t be 
surprising that the verdicts will be less objectionable.   
 The takeaway from this is that we can see knowledge entering the picture by virtue of the 
connection between knowledge and motivating reasons. If readers prefer to do things with a rule 
and without decision tables, they can adopt a gnostic view on which the operative rule is 
Reasonable Conviction and then offer some gnostic account of what reasonable belief is.31 If 
readers prefer to do things in terms of decision-theoretic norms and the promotion of value, it’s 
clear that if the right decision matrix to use is anything like the Gnostic Decision-Matrix 
sketched here we don’t maximize the relevant kind of expected value in Prisoners if we punish.   
 
8. Is Gnosticism Necessary? 
In part because I think we should consider Believe and Punish in tandem, I see Prisoners as 
another test case for our theories of epistemic justification and norms. The belief that the 
defendant was responsible for the assault rationalizes certain reactive attitudes. The belief, if 
justified, should justify these attitudes. If the thinker's grounds could not justify these reactive 
attitudes they could not justify the rationalizing belief. The evidence that we have in Prisoners 
doesn't justify the reactive attitudes. Statistical evidence justifies high confidence, but not 
outright belief. As Adler observed, "Mild resentment is never resentment caused by what one 
judges to be a serious offense directed toward oneself tempered by one’s degree of uncertainty in 
that judgment" (2002: 217). Blame, like resentment, requires a commitment to truth that differs 
from mere high confidence. Thus, Prisoners shows us that views like the Lockean view that take 
the high probability of truth to be sufficient for justification or proper belief are inadequate. 
Such grounds justify high confidence without justifying the kind of untempered commitment to 
truth required by affective responses and reactive attitudes.  
 The Lockeans miss this because they see the grounds that justify high confidence as 
grounds that, inter alia, justify full belief. The same problem arises for some reliabilist views that, 
																																																						
31 Moss (forthcoming) notes that a problem with a knowledge account (or a justified belief 
account) of the standard of proof gives us only a plausible story about criminal law. It tells us 
nothing about civil cases that use a preponderance of evidence standard.  We can generalize 
these proposals to the civil case in one of two ways. First, we might follow her lead in applying 
her notion of probabilistic knowledge (i.e., knowledge in which beliefs have probabilistic 
contents) to give us a knowledge-based account of the standard of proof in civil trials. Second, 
we might follow Blome-Tillman’s (forthcoming) lead in arguing that we need knowledge in both 
cases but that the knowledge is easier to attain in civil trials because the stakes are lower. My aim 
here is to explain why the concept of knowledge should figure in the story and why the decision-
theoretic argument we started with shouldn’t convince us that high probability is sufficient for 
just conviction.    
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similarly, regard high probability of truth as the essential feature of justification.32 If, as I've 
argued, Believe is false and this is a counterexample to the simple Lockean view of rational full 
belief, it is a counterexample to any reliabilist view that classifies lottery beliefs as justified. Most 
of us, I hope, would agree that the following thesis is false: 
Blame: It is appropriate to blame the defendant in Prisoners for 
assaulting the guard (and similar cases where the only evidence of 
guilt is statistical evidence).  
When it's inappropriate to blame an agent, it might be because the agent cannot be held 
accountable or because no wrong was committed. If it's inappropriate to blame our defendant, 
it's not for these reasons. In our case, it is inappropriate to blame just because it is inappropriate 
to take it as settled that the defendant did the deed in question. In our case, we couldn't justify 
the complex attitude of taking the defendant to have done the deed and failing to blame or 
censure. This is just what the Lockean or the reliabilist is committed to if they accept Believe but 
reject Blame. On these views, the justified complex attitude would be expressed by saying, 'Look, 
you assaulted the guard but I cannot blame you for that'. There's no justification for this stance if 
you think the guard didn't deserve to be assaulted. 
 The Lockeans probably missed this because their focus has been on one kind of 
rationalizing relation, the relation between belief and behavior. They've neglected the 
rationalizing relation that holds between belief and emotion.  An aversion to rain will combine 
with full belief and result in a decision to take an umbrella. In the absence of a full belief, 
sufficiently high confidence will also do the trick. The same isn't true for our reactive attitudes 
and so couldn't be true for the full beliefs that are required for their rationalization. 
 In this final section, we consider alternatives to the gnostic view offered above to see if 
they can solve our puzzle. Our focus will be on Sosa's recent work and some work inspired by it.  
Much of what I say about knowledge and its value is consistent with Sosa's views, but there are 
some small differences that might matter. 
 In his discussions of judgment and belief, Sosa characterizes a kind of success and 
correctness in terms of truth or accuracy but it's clear that he doesn't think that success (so 
understood) represents the highest kind of epistemic good. He defends two theses in the course 
of defending his performance normativity framework:  
Success is better than failure.  
Success through competence is better than success by luck (2011: 
63). 
Sosa's proposals are about endeavors in general, not just epistemic endeavors that involve 
judgment and belief. When it comes to belief and judgment, success is understood as accurate 
belief and success through competence is apt belief. On Sosa's view, apt belief is a kind of 
knowledge, animal knowledge. When apt belief is aptly noted, a thinker has a further kind of 
reflective knowledge. 
 Thus, Sosa would agree with the veritists that true belief is better than false belief from 
the epistemic point of view and with the gnostics that knowledge is better than true but inapt 
belief.   
 Developed in one way, the view would differ from both the simple veritist view and the 
gnostic view in that it would incorporate two theses:   
Accuracy is Good-Making: the accuracy of a true belief is, from 
the epistemic point of view, a good-making feature.  
																																																						
32 While you might expect most reliabilists to defend the view that we're justified in believing 
lottery propositions, Comesana (2009) discusses a reliabilist view that delivers the verdict that 
we're not justified in believing lottery propositions. It might be difficult to square this view with 
the rule-consequentialist rationale Goldman (1986) offers for reliabilism, but there might be 
alternative motivations for this approach to justification.   
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Aptness is Better-Making: the features of a belief that make it apt 
make it better, from the epistemic point of view, than accurate 
but inapt belief.          
Some sophisticated veritists accept this much and accept a further claim about the value of 
accurate belief:  
Accuracy is Better than Nothing: the accuracy of a true belief is, 
from the epistemic point of view, a good-making feature that 
makes it better to hold an accurate belief about p than no belief at 
all.  
According to Accuracy is Better than Nothing, the accurate belief is overall good, albeit a good 
that is inferior to apt belief.  I think that some sophisticated veritists who accept the two central 
theses of the performance normative framework are sympathetic to Accuracy is Better than 
Nothing. I'll have more to say about these theses in a moment. 
 In explaining why we should reject the simple Veritist Decision-Matrix and Belief-Matrix, 
I didn't frame things in terms of the comparative value of success and success through 
competence.  As it happens, I am quite sympathetic to the idea that knowledge is an accurate 
belief where the accuracy manifests the thinker's abilities, but the story that I'd offer to explain 
Aptness is Better-Making differs from Sosa's in a few respects.  First, my proposal doesn't appeal 
to the idea that belief or judgment involves any sort of endeavor or performance on the thinker's 
part. Thus, the success of the story doesn't turn on whether we should think of knowledge (or 
apt belief) as an achievement.33 It also isn't part of my story that success should be understood in 
terms of accuracy. While I don't think that any inaccurate belief can do what beliefs are supposed 
to, I also don't think that every accurate belief does what beliefs are supposed to. On my 
account, the value of a belief turns on whether it can do what beliefs are supposed to do. The 
point, purpose, or function of belief is to provide us with reasons that consist of facts, putting 
them into our possession so that they can be our reasons for thinking things, feeling things, and 
doing things. A belief can do this iff it constitutes knowledge or iff it is apt. Thus, on my gnostic 
view, Aptness is Better-Making is true because Aptness is Good-Making is true and every inapt 
belief is taken to be bad from the epistemic point of view. 
 This proposal about the relationship between belief, knowledge, and our potential 
motivating reasons played an essential role in my gnostic solution to the puzzle.  My proposal 
was that the law should recognize the superior value of knowledge and prefer the Gnostic 
Decision-Matrix to the Veritist Decision-Matrix on the grounds that the law should care about 
whether a jury's reason for convicting could be the fact that the defendant was involved. If not, 
the conviction should be seen as bad. If so, the conviction could be seen as good. The value of 
the conviction in the law's eyes depends upon what the jury could have known because this value 
turned on what the jury's reason for convicting could have been.  Sosa takes a dim view of this 
approach to the value of knowledge:  
... one’s action falls short if it is based on ostensible reasons that 
one does not know to be true. This is not because of the fact that 
a proposition can constitute your reason for X’ing only if it is 
something you know to be true. This is, I believe, at most a fairly 
superficial fact of English. But rather, there is a deeper, closely 
related truth here, which can be put in terms of one’s rationale, of 
one’s ostensible reasons, or of propositions adduced as reasons, 
or of stative reasons: i.e., beliefs on which one bases some further 
belief, or some choice or decision. The normative truth of interest 
is that if one acts based on a basis reason (or rationale), and if this 
																																																						
33 For criticism of the idea that knowledge is an achievement, see Hacker (2013). 
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reason is not something one knows to be true, then one’s action 
falls short (2011: 46). 
To illustrate this idea, he remarks:  
When someone flips a switch as a means to turning on a light, for 
example, he has an ostensible reason on which (in a broad sense) 
he bases his action, namely that flipping the switch is a means to 
turning on the light. Now, any action taken as a means to a 
further objective will of course fall short if it does not bring about 
that further objective. Moreover, it will still fall short if the 
objective is attained by a certain kind of luck: i.e., in a way that 
does not manifest the agent’s competence (2011: 46). 
If I understand Sosa's suggestion, it seems to be that the real reason that Aptness is Better-
Making is due to the fact that an apt belief is an instance of the general phenomenon of success 
manifesting excellence of ability and that this connection between knowledge and propositionally 
specified reasons is not the explanatorily relevant aspect.  
 If we play up the link between knowing p and manifesting competence and play down 
the link between knowing p and ensuring that p is among the reasons that could be an 
individual's reasons for φ-ing, I worry that we'll struggle to meet the Enoch, Fisher, and Spectre 
challenge. To meet that challenge, we have to show that the law should assign values to our 
decision-matrix to show that the law should think it's better not to punish in Prisoners. Suppose 
we think of success as consisting of things like accurately representing guilty defendants as guilty 
and correctly imposing harms upon the guilty and not the innocent and think of success that 
manifests competence as doing such things knowingly.  About this proposal we might ask two 
questions. First, should the law be convinced by the performance normativity argument for 
Aptness is Better-Making? If the law were moved by these kinds of considerations, what view 
should it take concerning Accuracy is Better than Nothing? 
 With respect to the first issue, it's not clear that the law should be moved by the kinds of 
considerations that Sosa offers in support of Aptness is Better-Making.  It looks like Sosa and I 
might agree on this point: when a thinker φs, her reason for φ-ing could not have been that p if 
she knew she didn't know p.  On my account, if the relevant action is voting to convict, 
convicting, or punishing, such acts aren't permitted unless done in the awareness that the 
defendant had committed some wrong because such acts aren't permitted unless they express 
blame. This awareness requires knowledge. The cases that fit this description will coincide with 
the cases where success manifests competence, but should we think that this feature is doing the 
explanatory work? One reason to think that it doesn't is that it seems to draw our attention to 
the wrong kind of thing, whether the jurors brought about the correct outcome or whether they 
brought it about excellently. It seems that the law should care about things like whether the 
punishments serve their intended function (i.e., expressing blame and leading to outcomes 
whereby it is just the guilty that suffer punishment) and not on further questions about whether 
those responsible for their distribution put on excellent performances. If this is right, it isn't clear 
that the performance normativity framework gives us the resources we need to justify the 
adoption of the decision-matrices that assign greater value to <Punish, Known Guilt> than 
<Punish, Unknown Guilt>. 
 With respect to the second issue, we need to know what values Sosa or a sophisticated 
veritist would assign to <Believe, Unknown Guilt> and <Punish, Unknown Guilt>.  A 
sophisticated veritist who sees accurate or true belief as a kind of success might also see 
punishing the guilty as a kind of success, in which case they might adopt a view that incorporates 
Accuracy is Better than Nothing and Aptness is Better-Making and offer us a third set of 
decision and belief matrices:  
  
 Known Guilt Unknown Guilt Innocent 
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Punish +1 +1 > v > -10 -10 
Don't Punish 0 0  0 
 
 
 Known Guilt Unknown Guilt Innocent 
Believe +1 +1 > v > -10 -10 
Don't Believe 0 0  0 
 
Because the sophisticated veritist sees accurate belief as a state that is always better to have than 
to lack, the decision-theoretic argument that the Lockeans used to try to justify Believe is back 
on the table. Even when we know that we could not hope for success through competence (e.g., 
when we're dealing with propositions that we know that we couldn't know), we could also know 
that owing to the likelihood of success or accuracy, the expected epistemic value of Believe could 
be positive. If so, the expected epistemic value of Believe would exceed that of Don't Believe 
since that option never realizes any value at all. 
 Once the argument for Believe is back on the table, the ancillary argument for Punish is 
back on the table. The sophisticated veritist might try to find some way to resist that argument, 
but remember that the proponents of the performance normativity framework often try to 
motivate their view by asking us to consider analogies between epistemic and practical 
performances. If someone thinks that these analogies are helpful in thinking about practical and 
epistemic normativity, they might be disposed to think that the kinds of argument that supported 
Believe would also support Punish.    
 One nice feature of Sosa's own view is that he doesn't accept the sophisticated veritist 
view just sketched. While he accepts Accuracy is Good-Making (and Aptness is Better-Making), 
he doesn't think that accurate belief is better than no belief at all. As he might put it, his view is 
about the value of performances. A false belief is a bad performance (in a way) but the absence 
of belief is not any sort of performance at all. Since he doesn't compare the value of these 
performances to non-performances (or beliefs to the absence of belief), he doesn't defend the 
view that <Believe, Unknown Guilt> is better than <Don't Believe, Unknown Guilt>. As such, 
the decision-theoretic reasoning that is supposed to support Believe wouldn't move him. 
 Because the sophisticated veritist's value theory implies that Believe maximizes expected 
epistemic value, the sophisticated veritist can only resist the argument for Believe (and the 
ancillary argument for Punish) by defending norms that tell us that we should sometimes refrain 
from believing or doing that which we know would maximize the relevant kind of expected 
value. Because Sosa's value theory has no such implication, it might seem that Sosa would have 
an easier time blocking the arguments for Believe and Punish.   
 While Sosa does reject the Lockean view that says that it's always rational to fully believe 
when it's rational to have some sufficiently high degree of confidence, there still might be aspects 
of his view that make it difficult for him to reject Believe and Punish.  Because Sosa's account of 
epistemic goodness is an account of the comparative value of performances, it differs from the 
sophisticated veritist view insofar as it doesn't suggest that accurate but inapt belief is better than 
the absence of belief. (It's this feature of his view that allows him to accept Accuracy is Good-
Making without any commitment to Accuracy is Better than Nothing.)  While there's no clear 
commitment on Sosa's part to the premises of the arguments that support Believe and Punish, 
it's also not clear that Sosa's view gives us the tools we'd need to reject these theses and show 
where the arguments offered in their support went wrong. 
 One key point of difference between Sosa's account and the sophisticated veritist 
account just sketched is about whether it would be regrettable for a thinker to fail to add an 
accurate or apt belief to her stock of beliefs.  One key point of agreement between these 
accounts is that they seem to accept this kind of conditional: if the thinker is to form a belief 
about whether p (because she aims to settle the question whether p), it would be better for her to 
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believe accurately than inaccurately and better still to believe aptly than inaptly. What would Sosa 
say about cases where the thinker endeavors to settle the question, sees that she could not aptly 
affirm that p but also sees that there is very little risk of error? Here it is helpful to think about 
Sosa's approach to suspension of judgment:  
Suspension of judgment is an intentional double- omission, 
whereby one omits affirmation, whether positive or negative. 
Inherent to rational suspension is the assessment that affirmation 
is then too risky, which implies that, whether positive or negative, 
it would not then be apt, or at least the absence of assessment 
that it would be apt (2015: 83). 
In situations where suspension of judgment is not mandatory, either belief or denial would be 
permitted. This is because, as Sosa puts it, suspension, and denial as part of a threefold choice. In 
cases like Prisoners, it certainly seems that affirmation wouldn't be too risky, not if we think of the 
relevant kind of risk as risk of error. The risk of error in this case is lower than in some cases of 
apt belief, so it would seem that even if the judgment in the defendant's guilt isn't apt or doesn't 
constitute knowledge, suspension wouldn't be mandatory precisely because the risk of inaccuracy 
is so low. If so, it looks as if Sosa's view might be like the Lockean's view insofar as both views 
seem to imply that it is permissible to believe once the probability of accuracy is sufficiently high 
even if it differs from the Lockean view about whether such beliefs are required.  If so, it looks as 
if Sosa's view might support Believe. 
 The problematic case, from my point of view, is the case in which a thinker can see that 
there's very little chance that her belief would be inaccurate even though it's clear that her belief 
would be inapt.  Sosa might try to meet these challenges in a few ways. First, he might say that 
the permissibility of belief turns on the risk of inaptness, not just inaccuracy. I fear that this way of 
going makes the standards governing belief, punishment, and blame too demanding. If a thinker 
aptly believes the defendant is guilty, shouldn't this be sufficient for belief, blame, and 
punishment? A belief can be apt even if, given the thinker's evidence, it's highly unlikely to be 
apt.34 Thus, I don't think we'd want to say that a thinker should suspend whenever there is high 
risk of forming an inapt belief because such situations are sometimes situations in which a 
thinker could nevertheless form an apt belief. 
 In trying to undermine the arguments for Punish and Believe, I've assumed that cases 
relevantly similar to lottery cases are cases of inapt belief. All of the arguments offered here 
assume that a lottery belief is inapt even if accurate. Sosa has contested this. He thinks that we 
can know lottery propositions (2015: 120).  If Sosa is right about this, this would undo all of my 
arguments in this paper. 
 One reason that I wanted to discuss this puzzle in the course of discussing Sosa's 
epistemology was that I thought that the case provided us with an interesting new perspective on 
lottery propositions.  While this isn't true of every reader, I expect that many readers agree that 
Punish is wrong. The crucial intuition is not universally shared, but it is widely shared.  If I'm 
wrong and we can know lottery propositions, how can we account for the intuitions that Punish 
and Blame are false?  On its face, it seems that if the jury knew that the defendant was guilty in 
some case (and the evidence that constituted the basis of this knowledge was admissible), it 
should also seem appropriate to punish. And yet, it seems inappropriate to punish. 
 Sosa could say, quite rightly, that there might be further reasons not to punish that could 
explain why we shouldn't punish even when we know that a defendant is guilty. There might be 
some interesting reason why the law should treat certain kinds of knowledge as pieces of 
intelligence that we shouldn't act on. For my own part, I don't know what such a story would 
look like. I worry that even if such a story could be told, we'd need a further story to handle 
these issues in non-legal contexts. For my own part, it seems that just as it would be 
																																																						
34 See Williamson (2011) for a defense of improbable knowing.  
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inappropriate to punish in Prisoners, it would also be inappropriate for people to take up certain 
reactive attitudes towards the defendant. Again, it seems strange to think that it would be 
inappropriate to take up reactive attitudes towards someone if you truly knew that they did 
something truly awful.  If we work from the assumption that we don't know lottery propositions, 
it seems we have lots of the tools available for vindicating these intuitions. If, however, we work 
from the assumption that we know lottery propositions, it seems we wouldn't have any of these 
tools. Thus, I see the intuitions that generate our initial puzzle as intuitions that provide further 
support for the position that we don't know lottery propositions.  Readers who think that we can 
know such propositions should try to generate their own solution to the puzzle.35 
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